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CTSC and IceCube undertook a collaborative effort to conduct a cybersecurity risk assessment 
that analyzed the existing IceCube cybersecurity plan and cyberinfrastructure. The risk 
assessment was used to gather, document, and prioritize IceCube risks. From that assessment 
CTSC and IceCube developed this cybersecurity plan with a set of recommendations for IceCube 
to improve their existing cybersecurity program. This cybersecurity plan was developed based 
on the identified risks, threats and vulnerabilities from the assessment exercise. The result is an 
informed approach to the cybersecurity for the IceCube cyberinfrastructure. 
 
For the purpose of this document we are defining a Cybersecurity Plan as a long-term 
structured approach to develop, implement and maintain an environment that ensures the 
reliability and trustworthiness of organizational assets. 
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1  IceCube Cybersecurity Plan Overview  
CTSC team members and IceCube staff undertook a collaborative effort to conduct a 
cybersecurity risk assessment and to develop a cybersecurity plan for the IceCube.  This effort 
began in May 2013 with the formation of the CTSC team and initial communications with Steve 
Barnet and Gonzalo Merino of IceCube. Over the following months, the CTSC and IceCube 
conducted  a  risk  assessment  exercise  considering  both  IceCube’s  cyberinfrastructure  and  
existing cybersecurity plan that identified key areas in need of development that would 
strengthen the security posture of the IceCube environment. 
 
In addition to this cybersecurity plan, a separate report documenting the risk assessment 
process and its findings are included in the final deliverables for this engagement. 
Cybersecurity planning begins with identifying the assets that are of value to the 
organization and implementing a set of controls to minimize the risk to those assets from a 
wide variety of threats. The result of such an assessment can be used to prioritize tasks and 
allocate the resources providing the most effective risk management strategy. 
When approaching the task of developing a cybersecurity plan for IceCube, the CTSC team 
members applied the cybersecurity planning lifecycle methodology featured in Figure 
1.  Steps 1 through 3 have been completed during this engagement: 
 
1. Defining the project goals and documenting the operational environment. Including 
review  of  IceCube’s  existing  Cybersecurity  policies,  procedures  and  plan. 
2. Identifying risks, threats and impact to IceCube assets. 
3. Identifying controls that can be implemented to minimize the risk to IceCube assets. 
 
The next step is to apply the recommendations (controls) to the IceCube environment found 
in Section 2, “IceCube Cybersecurity Planning Goals.” The recommendations have been 
categorized into a plan based upon a number of considerations including the findings of the 
risk assessment process, observations made during the engagement and comparison to 
commonly used best practices for the CI community. 
 
As a result of the work performed in the engagement, it should be acknowledged that the 
CTSC team found IceCube to have a relatively mature cybersecurity program in comparison 
to other CI projects of similar size. For reference, the following existing IceCube policies, 
procedures and related documents that support the IceCube cybersecurity program were 
reviewed: 
 
 UW-IceCube Security Policy and Procedures 
 Acceptable Use Policy and IceCube VO1 
 IceCube Incident Response and Escalation Procedures                                                              
1 http://icecube.wisc.edu/collaboration/aup  
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 IceCube Network Security Zones (Infrastructure Diagram - “i3zones.pdf”) 
 IceCube Science DMZ (Infrastructure Diagram - “Science  DMZ.pdf”) 
 IceCube Live System Security2 
 
It seems clear that having to interact with the facility at the South Pole, which operates 
under FISMA, caused IceCube to have to initially consider and document their 
cyberinfrastructure  and  cybersecurity.  However,  as  with  any  cybersecurity  plan,  IceCube’s  
must be regularly reviewed and adjusted as the environment and personnel are always in a 
state of change.  New threats emerge and the cybersecurity plan must anticipate these new 
hazards and offer protection and guidance when they arise. And finally, one must be alert to 
degradations in the program due to the distractions from the day-to-day operation of 
scientific cyberinfrastructure and the loss of knowledge that can come about from personnel 
changes. 
 
 Figure 1. Cybersecurity Program Lifecycle 
 
                                                                   
2 https://docushare.icecube.wisc.edu/dsweb/Services/Document-55765  
Project Goals and Environment Documentation 
Identify Risks, Threats, Vulnerabilities And Impact 
Identify Controls To Mitigate Risk Apply Security Controls 
Review 
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2  IceCube Cybersecurity Planning Goals 
 
This section lists overall recommendations for risk mitigation that have been categorized into a 
plan based upon a number of considerations including the findings of the risk assessment 
process, observations made during the engagement and comparison to commonly used best 
practices  for  the  CI  community.  IceCube’s  past  work  in  developing  a  cybersecurity  program  was  
considered during the assessment process and as a result, it was found to be well positioned in 
addressing the most critical threats that were identified. Because of this past work, there were 
no high risk threats that were identified. 
 2.1  High Risk Mitigation Recommendations 
 
There  were  no  ‘High’  risk  threats  identified  through  the  risk  assessment  process.  2.2  Medium Risk Mitigation Recommendations  
This section sets out recommendations for controls that (a) would have a significant impact on 
improving the IceCube cybersecurity posture and/or (b) are deemed important enough that 
work should begin on them as soon as is possible. These recommendations have been 
suggested  to  address  the  ‘Medium’  threats  identified  out  of  the  risk  assessment  process. 
 
1. Identify information security responsibilities for IceCube, i.e., the person (or team) that 
leads IceCube security.  At a minimum this should include operational security, security 
policies, incident response, and the overall vision for the IceCube security 
program.  Security teams are effective when they have representation from key areas 
within a project such as networking, system administration and management. 
  
2. Increase frequency and automate vulnerability scans for all IceCube network connected 
devices. The risk assessment identified medium level risk in vulnerable IceCube 
servers.  Identifying and addressing vulnerabilities  in  IceCube’s  infrastructure  is  critical  in  
protecting against attackers who are continually scanning the Internet for resources 
they can compromise.  IceCube conducts vulnerability scans on a semi-monthly basis. 
We recommended this activity be increased to weekly scans.  The scanning tool IceCube 
uses (Nessus) can be scheduled to run automatically without human involvement. Failed 
scans  can  be  sent  to  an  email  list  ‘security-alert@icecube.wisc.edu’  (that includes 
members of the security team) for remediation.  We also recommend web application 
scanning (e.g., IBM Security Appscan3) of the i3Live web server on a weekly basis as 
well.  And we recommend the security team sign up to automatically receive                                                              
3 http://www-03.ibm.com/software/products/en/appscan/  
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vulnerability notices4 for the Django web application framework5 and apply upgrades 
accordingly. 
 
3. Review, update and communicate IceCube operational procedures.  IceCube has a 
number of existing policies, including the UW-IceCube Security Policy and Procedures 
document, Acceptable Use Policy and Incident Response procedures.  Having 
documented policies and procedures helps ensure that all users, PIs, and staff members 
understand their respective roles and responsibilities.  The existing policies were 
developed some time ago by a former IceCube staff member.  We recommend 
reviewing these policies, updating them and communicating them on an annual basis.  
There were some specific areas that were identified in the risk assessment that could 
benefit from continued development.  For example, some additions to the acceptable 
use policy covering credential management (using strong passwords, managing and 
protecting)  would  help  promote  awareness  of  IceCube’s  policies. The University of 
Wisconsin-Madison  Office  of  Campus  Information  Security  publishes  a  “Creating  a  
Strong”  password  guide6 that could be referenced. 
   2.3  Long Terms Goals / Recommendations 
 
The set of controls in this category are deemed important, but are recognized as being involved 
and needing additional time to develop.  Like the controls found in previous areas in this report, 
several will need a more formal process put in place to address the issues on a continual 
basis.  These long term recommendations should be considered and planned as soon as 
possible. 
 
The long term recommendations have been broken into the following two, broad 
categories:  Operational Recommendations and Auditing and Review Process 
Recommendations. 
 
Operational Recommendations  
1. Develop a cybersecurity awareness program.  A security awareness program is an 
organized  approach  to  inform  staff  about  IceCube’s security related policies and 
procedures as well as general security related tips (identifying social engineering 
attacks, keeping desktops/laptops secure, etc.).  The awareness program can use a 
variety of ways to communicate to users:  email notifications, annual training sessions, 
                                                             
4 http://www.cvedetails.com/vulnerability-feeds-form.php  
5 http://www.cvedetails.com/vulnerability-list/vendor_id-10199/product_id-18211/Djangoproject-Django.html  6 http://www.cio.wisc.edu/security-secure-passwords.aspx 
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on-line resources, etc.. Ideally some form of cybersecurity awareness should be 
incorporated into new employee training program.  
2. Implement an intrusion detection system.  An intrusion detection system (IDS) monitors 
network and system activities for malicious activities or policy violation.  These systems 
can take the form of software or devices.  There are a number of different options 
available but one crucial component is the development of the skills needed to 
understand the results of the IDS.  IDS systems can be broken into two categories: 
network and host based systems.    
 
Host based IDS systems monitor the host, or computer, they reside on.  These systems 
look at both the dynamic behavior and the state of the computer.  For example, the 
system would monitor the operating and file systems of the host.  A profile would be 
developed on each file, including such things as size, permissions, modification dates, 
etc. This information would be watched and tracked.  If system files are suspiciously 
modified or there is other unexpected activity, the IDS could notify administrators for 
further investigation. 
 
Network based IDSs detect intrusions by analyzing network traffic and looking for signs 
of attack.  These systems take two forms: 
 
 Rule based systems look at network traffic and system activities for patterns that 
match known exploits.  These known events are the rules that the system 
matches against.  This is much like how antivirus software works. 
 Analysis based systems monitor network and system activities for events that fall 
outside the normal usage.  This could include such events as abnormal 
bandwidth, protocols, ports, foreign IP addresses or devices generally not used, 
etc. 
 
There are a number of (mostly) open source IDS projects that we recommend: 
 
All Inclusive Security-onion (http://securityonion.blogspot.com/) 
Host Based OSSEC (http://www.ossec.net/) 
Samhain (http://la-samhna.de/samhain/) 
Tripwire (http://www.tripwire.com - Commercial product) 
Network Based Snort (http://snort.org/) 
Suricata (http://suricata-ids.org/) 
Bro (http://bro-ids.org/) 
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3. Expand the IceCube Incident Response Plan. When IceCube experiences a security 
event, some type of incident response is necessary. A good incident response plan can 
minimize the effects of a security breach, allowing for a quick recovery and avoiding 
negative publicity.  IceCube has had an established Incident Response and Escalation 
plan for a number of years.  Some consideration should be given to expand the existing 
policy to give direction on documenting events and learning from them.  This will help 
with measuring the effectiveness of response process and can be used to make 
adjustments for improvement.  It can also act as a learning tool to avoid repeating past 
mistakes and for new staff that were not involved in the initial response. 
 
In addition to expanding event documentation, information sharing guidelines should be 
considered.  How are security events communicated to users, project management, 
funding agencies and other stakeholders?  Answers to these questions should be 
decided upon well in advance of an incident.   
 
The following resources provide Incident Response plans that can be used for 
comparison. 
 
 Tulane University Computer Incident Response Plan7 
 RedHat Incident Response Guide8 
 NIST Incident Response Guide9 
 
4. Track Science DMZ Best Practices. IceCube (at least at UW-Madison) operates a Science 
DMZ, which is a relatively new concept at this point. We recommend that IceCube 
continues to track emerging best cybersecurity practices coming from ESnet and the 
broader community. One recommendation would be to assign at least one member of 
the IceCube team to subscribe to the ScienceDMZ mailing list10 in order to learn from 
and contribute to that community. Additionally, checking network performance and 
reliability using the recommended tool, perfSONAR11, on a continual basis would be a 
good practice. Regarding the (secure) movement of large amounts of data over a DMZ, 
IceCube may want to investigate the use of Globus Online12 as a cloud-based service for 
its user community. 
                                                              
7 
http://isowiki.tulane.edu/Tulane_Information_Security_Policies/Tulane_University_Computer_Incident_Response
_Plan 
8 https://access.redhat.com/knowledge/docs/en-US/Red_Hat_Enterprise_Linux/3/html/Security_Guide/ch-
response.html 
9 http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/drafts/800-61-rev2/draft-sp800-61rev2.pdf 
10 https://gab.es.net/mailman/listinfo/sciencedmz  
11 http://www.perfsonar.net/  
12 https://www.globus.org/  
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Auditing & Review Process Recommendations 
 
5. Plan Audit & Review.  All of the above proposed recommendations will only be effective 
if they are closely watched and modified as time progresses.  This means there is a need 
for auditing of the controls themselves so that weaknesses in the approach can be 
identified and addressed.  Along with the auditing, regular reviews are necessary to 
determine the effectiveness of the control. 
 
Without regular reviews, a cybersecurity strategy will quickly become out of date and its 
effectiveness will diminish.  At a minimum, an annual review of the cybersecurity plan, 
beginning with a risk assessment activity, should be conducted to determine what 
changes  have  taken  place  that  the  plan  doesn’t  address. 
 
The review may identify the need for new policies, procedures, training/education and 
security controls that should be added to a revised cybersecurity plan.  3  Author Information 
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